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Recent writing on development coming from North America makes a distinction between 
Indigenous life projects and development projects. ‘Indigenous life projects’ refers to the desires 
of those Indigenous people who seek autonomy in deciding the meaning of their life independently 
of projects promoted by the state and market, and to people developing their own situation-based 
knowledge and practices in the contemporary world. As formulated by Mario Blaser (2004), these can 
involve partnerships and co-existences, where such are not denied by the encompassing society, and 
involve continuously emergent forms and resilience on the part of the Indigenous people. 
Such life projects in Indigenous Australia are rarely spontaneously or comprehensively formulated 
but rather partial, reactive to government policy and often internally contested, especially across 
the generations, within even the smallest communities. If elicited in responses to inquiries, their 
formulation is usually ad hoc and, if they are self-conscious and coherent, they are frequently 
formulated in a Christian context. Nevertheless, the drive to establish outstations is certainly one of 
the more widespread and easily identifiable of Indigenous life projects in remote Australia. A recurrent 
emphasis in almost all Indigenous life projects, even if the meaning is unclear, is with holding on to 
‘culture’. 
The currents from the wider world surrounding the formation and instantiation of such life projects 
are complex and often contradictory. Holding on to culture can be challenged by the emergence of 
consumer dependencies and autonomy in deciding the trajectory of life projects may run up against 
many government policies and external pressures.  Indigenous acceptance of a lower standard of living 
(for example, by operating in a hybrid economy, Altman 2001)1 as the cost of increased autonomy and 
residing at valued remote places, can be politicised by others, resulting in unsought intervention. If the 
health and educational statistics are too discrepant from national standards, protest from Aboriginal 
and non-Aboriginal supporters of Aboriginal rights, and even the international community, may result 
in demands for action by the state, regardless of local opinion.2 
The vulnerability of the state to accusations of discriminatory or inequitable treatment of the 
Indigenous minority, and the moral hazard for the state that is always present in even the most 
generous self-determination, means that some external pressures on Indigenous life projects are 
unlikely to go away until such time as people approach regional statistical equality and ultimately 
become no more dependent on the public purse than other people in the region.3 It seems inevitable 
that in achieving such a situation, work, mainly in the form of selling labour, is going to be the lot 
of Aboriginal people as it is for the population at large.  Most government-initiated development 
projects, Indigenous community plans, and statements of community needs, take the requirement for 
employment as a, if not the, central issue in a better future for remote communities. Currently this 
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is generally spoken about in terms of Aboriginal people being involved in the ‘real’ economy rather 
than the passive welfare economy (Pearson 2000). The difficulty with this formulation is that although 
people are, for the most part, deeply engaged  in the welfare economy, that engagement has its own 
cultural specificities.  What vitiates so many of the proposals about economic development is that 
they fail to explicitly address these cultural specificities and ignore the fact that all economic activity 
– theirs and ours – is cultural. Of course, over the years a wide range of practical accommodations 
have been made to these cultural specificities on the ground, and in the work place, the more formal 
including CDEP and contracting and the less formal including modified expectations vis-a-vis the 
general labour force and a wide range of ad hoc arrangements.4 Moving from a world in which work 
was largely self-planned, self-directed activity and embedded in a highly specific set of social relations 
in precolonial times, to labour being fully commoditised in a market economy, embedded in a quite 
different set of social relations, necessarily entails considerable social and cultural transformations.
In this paper I want to look at the cultural structuring of Aboriginal economic activity in remote 
Australia at three periods: precolonial, postcolonial to c. 1970, and c. 1970 to the present and to 
consider how an understanding of this structuring may help shed light on Indigenous economic 
practice in remote Australia in the twenty-first century and the contexts within which Aboriginal life 
projects may develop there. 
Precolonial
At the core of work is a combination of activity and effort. The primary focus of activity and 
effort, precolonially, was in acquiring a livelihood through the productive activities of hunting and 
gathering. The important point about this, and virtually all other activity in these situations, however, 
was its embeddedness in kinship relations and/or group relations. Further production was nearly 
always intimately linked with consumption, even before the activity took place, through obligations 
and commitments to certain kin. At the same time, within these social constraints, it was largely self-
planned and self-directed activity. The social relations that encompass this activity system have been 
conceptualised in terms of the domestic mode of production.
Marshall Sahlins developed the model of the domestic mode of production as a consequence of 
research carried out by Richard Lee (1965) on the San, and Fredrick McCarthy and Margaret McArthur 
on Arnhem Landers (published in 1960, based on work in 1948) that dramatically challenged ideas 
about the nature of work effort put in by hunter gatherers. Sahlins pointed out that Aboriginal people 
at Fish Creek, near Oenpelli, spent only 3 hours 50 minutes a day in subsistence work if they were 
male and 3 hours 44 minutes if they were female and that for the Hemple Bay group on Groote 
Eylandt it was just over 5 hours a day.5 The most obvious conclusion Sahlins drew from this research 
was that Aboriginal people, and by implication hunter-gatherers generally, ‘do not work hard’ (1972:
17) spending only four to five hours a day in the food quest.  Further, he noted, the Fish Creek group 
maintained a virtually full-time craftsman who, when he was not repairing or making things, ‘spent 
most of his time talking, eating and sleeping’ (McCarthy and McArthur 1960:148).  Indeed the main 
alternative to work was sleep (1972:19). 
The domestic mode of production is a system of production and consumption organised at the 
household level with finite and limited production objectives to satisfy limited wants, resulting in the 
maximisation of free time. It is a system of underproduction because those households with much 
labour reach the production objectives rapidly. From time to time production is increased in response 
to kinship demands to support collective ceremonial activity. 
Although the emphasis in his account of the ‘Original affluent society’ is on the maximisation of 
leisure, at the end of the chapter, Sahlins refers briefly to Donald Thomson’s observation, given in 
full here, that:
The first impression than any stranger must receive in a fully organised group in 
Eastern Arnhem Land is of industry. He cannot fail to see that everybody, man 
or woman, works hard, and that the work is well organised and runs smoothly. 
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And he must also be impressed by the fact that … there is no idleness. Even the 
young men are engaged fully in hunting and fishing activities and work hard, in 
marked contrast with the conditions in similar groups close to white settlement, 
where the organisation is breaking down. Neither men nor women are idle for 
long, and even in camp as they sit around their fires they may be seen to pick up 
a basket, a fish net, a spear or other weapon, and work at this as they talk, just 
as they did when they halted at midday to rest and to cook food. Yet there is no 
feeling of haste, but rather of method, of system and order.
What are the drives, the incentives, which lie behind all this organisation? Why 
does it move so smoothly, and what induces these people to work hard, so 
willingly, without any apparent direction, control or authority? (1949:33-34)
Thomson argued that the motivation came primarily from the social obligations of reciprocity 
arising out of the kinship system and leading to widespread gift exchange. This, he believed, had been 
intensified in Arnhem Land  through the impact of the annual visits of Macassans since the early 
eighteenth century, which led to the development of an extensive system of ceremonial exchange, 
because of the demand for metal and other goods from inland peoples (1949:5).
This concern with what motivated people to special effort had first been taken up by Thomson in 
connection with the work he did in Cape York where he observed an elaborate set of performances 
associated with the Hero Cult (1933). He argued that the effort in completing the final part of the 
Hero Cult, especially, the ‘infinite labour and patience required to fashion the elaborate masks and 
head-dresses’, which demanded weeks of preparation, would never be achieved if it were not for 
a psychological force which spurred the old men on in a way that no material reward ever could 
(1933:489).6 Although he is not terribly clear about this psychological force, he sees it in terms of the 
accumulated build-up of the earlier stages of the ceremony, acting through society as a consequence 
of the effect on the ‘collective mind of the removal of the youths by the masked dancers to the 
sound of the bull roarers which give concrete form to the forces at work on the sacred ground and 
stimulated the old men to great effort’ (1933:489). He goes on to suggest that the degree of sacredness 
is proportional to the amount of time invested in ceremony.
Influenced by these remarks of Thomson’s, Sahlins concludes his essay by raising the possibility 
that among other hunter-gatherers the fragile superstructure of cycles of exchange and ritual may have 
disappeared without trace and that this may account for the degree of leisure time.
In Sahlins’ book, Stone Age Economics, the chapters on the domestic mode of production are 
followed by three on the transfer of goods and people, or exchange as we somewhat misleadingly call 
it (Hunt 2000). In these chapters he continues the exploration of economy as a category of culture 
rather than behaviour, directed at the reproduction of social orders rather than as simply need-serving 
activities. The burden of his argument is that every transfer ‘embodies some coefficient of sociability, 
[so that it] cannot be understood in its material terms apart from its social terms’ (1972:183), and he 
goes on to develop a ‘scheme of reciprocities’ from generalised to balanced and negative, and to show 
its correlation with kinship distance. Building, of course, on Mauss, he elaborates the ways in which 
transfers (reciprocities, exchange) are at the heart of social life and how it is that gifts make friends 
(1972:186). 
In his review of the organization of production across the Australian continent, Ian Keen (2003:
322-328) indicates that most work tasks of males and females required only one person although people 
frequently worked in parallel in small groups, especially women, who never foraged alone.  Women 
working in parallel, controlled the product of their own labour and did not pool and redistribute 
food. For men the issue was more complex because they often secured quantities of meat beyond 
that required by their immediate household so that rules for distribution of meat came into play. 
These resulted in the best cuts of meat circulating beyond the hunter’s household, especially to affinal 
kin. Central to the model of the domestic mode of production was that under normal circumstances 
the consumption unit for which production took place was one or two households. Such clusters of 
two or three households functioning as production and consumption units have been reported from 
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Arnhem Land  (Altman 1987) while the band has never been reported as a basic production and 
consumption unit – that is, in a collective pooling of food. 
From settlement to c. 1970
Because of the nature of the economic relations between Aboriginal people and Europeans 
following settlement, the domestic mode of production was perpetuated outside the towns. This was 
because they entered a largely cashless economy on cattle stations and in mission communities, based 
on rationing and payment in kind.
On cattle stations, the domestic mode of production was maintained because of the internal 
colonial model of relations with the pastoralists. Continued hunting and gathering by the dependents 
of the young men and women working for the station was crucial to the support of the Aboriginal 
populations on the stations, because they were only lightly rationed, and because of the low ratio of 
workers to non-workers. Even the workers were not employed full-time, but had long lay-off periods 
when they were expected to supplement their rations with foraging.
On most mission communities the situation was not much different. Governments chose to 
administer to Aboriginal people through mission bodies because it was a great deal cheaper for them 
to do so than using public servants. Rations, everywhere, were the order of the day.  Rationing was 
a complex practice which has been examined  in detail by Tim Rowse (1998). Introduced initially to 
prevent cattle spearing, he shows that from the beginning there was a concern that rationing could 
lead to pauperisation and moral decay for able-bodied people, if there were not a regime of ‘no work 
no rations’. Living conditions on most missions were little, if any, different from the cattle stations. 
A great deal of foraging went on to supplement food supplies and people were protected from any 
substantive consumer dependency for items other than necessities, except tobacco, by their own 
poverty and the poverty of the missions themselves. 
As Rowse points out, until the 1970s little attention was paid to Aboriginal motivations for 
becoming involved in a rationing relationship or how they understood it. In respect of motivation, 
remote Australia is of interest because considerable numbers of people were not dispossessed of 
their land and had a choice between continuing to live an independent life in the bush or associating 
themselves with Europeans. The reasons why Aboriginal people chose to associate with Europeans 
were clearly complex and variable but we know that curiosity, the attraction of addictive substances 
such as tobacco and sugar, and the avoidance of conflict with both Europeans and Aboriginal 
people, all played a part.  A key question is what kept them attached to European settlers.  Although 
European settlements have been referred to as ‘super waterholes’ (McKnight 1986), the conditions in 
many situations, such as on pastoral stations, were frequently appalling, and people were often near 
to starvation, especially those not working (Berndts 1987). Some people did move back and forth 
between the bush and the settlement and in some mission situations this was actually institutionalised, 
as the missions did not have adequate funds to support everybody at once (Falkenberg 1962), but the 
enthusiasm and speed with which people settled down is well illustrated with the establishment of 
Maningrida in 1957 (Hiatt 1965).7  
The speed with which the bush life was given up suggests that it was probably rather more arduous 
or relentless than Sahlins implies, and more like the hard work that Altman’s revisionist analysis 
emphasises. Settled life was certainly safer (Slotte 1997) and more stimulating. The consequences and 
transformations of settling down could not have been known or foreseen and it possible that in many 
cases the settling down was unintended.
From 1968 to the present
This period began with people in remote Australia entering the cash economy in a substantive way 
for the first time, with the decision of the Department of Social Security to pay entitlements directly 
to Aboriginal individuals, following the pastoral award decision that required the payment of equal 
wages to Aboriginal people in 1968. 
Aboriginal poverty until the payment of award wages and of unemployment benefits, which 
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became widespread circa 1975-1977, is startling. In 1970 per capita cash incomes in remote desert 
Australia ranged from 6.8-22 percent of the Australia-wide figure and even on cattle stations only 
ranged between 13-32 percent. The grinding poverty and its acceptance by government is reflected in 
the fact that the sum that the Northern Territory government estimated was adequate to cover rent, 
food and clothing on an Aboriginal settlement was about 12 percent of the national average income 
(Peterson 1986:91-92)! Astonishingly, despite this low income, people did have enough discretionary 
income to buy cars, even with very low levels of work.  This was because social security was providing 
in excess of 75 percent of minimal cash needs, so that by target working (working for short periods 
to acquire money for specific purposes) it was quite possible for people to accumulate relatively large 
sums of money to buy cars and/or alcohol. 
The really dramatic changes came with the payment of award wages and unemployment benefits. 
This resulted in the great majority of the population of the communities and of the cattle stations 
becoming unemployed, yet because of the low consumer dependency, the communities were, relatively 
speaking, awash with cash. The immediate consequence was an almost a complete detachment from 
productive activity and a decade or so in which there was what has been referred to as welfare 
autonomy (Arthur 2001).8 Concurrent changes in government policy that resulted in the development 
of the outstation movement, among other things, meant that, paradoxically, integration into the cash 
economy actually led to the renewing of difference for some people who moved back to their own 
lands (see Austin-Broos 2003:119).   
At this point, understanding the cultural structuring of the economy in terms of the domestic mode 
of production becomes problematic.  This is not to say that the original social relations of production 
disappeared but the almost exclusive focus of these relations became circulation and consumption. 
Like the Chinese peasants standing on tip-toe to keep their heads above water, life was precarious for 
many individuals. A loss at cards, a trip to town, a loan to a friend, all meant people would have to seek 
money elsewhere, such as from those with pensions, unemployment payments, or those few with jobs. 
This context then brings to the fore what Sahlins variously referred to as the coefficient of sociability 
or the scheme of reciprocities, as the central structuring factors in economic activity. 
With circulation as the central feature of economic activity, attention is focussed on kinship, 
reciprocity and sharing practices.  The centrality of kinship to the organisation of everyday activities 
among hunting and gathering peoples living independent, self-sufficient lives led, among other things, 
to the formulation of the kinship mode of production as an alternative to the domestic mode of 
production. Under this model, universal systems of kin classification and a strong emphasis on sharing 
were seen as mechanisms that ensured people access to the means of production over very wide 
areas, securing survival when local conditions were poor (Godelier 1975). It would be easy enough 
to suggest that the kinship mode of production provides insight into the economic behaviour in this 
period, with people activating their networks to obtain money rather than to secure access  to distant 
places where environmental conditions were better. However, given the absence of production, 
theoretical attention needs to be focussed on the allocation and circulation of resources in a way that 
bridges the domestic mode of production of the precolonial period with that unearned income. In 
these circumstances, a move away from a mode of production analysis to one couched in terms of 
moral economy is helpful.
Moral economy has been used in two senses. E. P. Thompson (1991:339-340), who popularized 
the term, uses it to refer to beliefs and understandings that assign economic roles to classes and that 
endorse aspects of customary relations and practices across these class relationships, rather than 
just pure market relations.9 More commonly it is now used to refer to values that impinge on profit 
maximisation.  Here it is used to refer to the allocation of resources to the reproduction of social 
relationships at the cost of profit maximisation and obvious immediate personal benefit (for example, 
see Cheal 1989). Nicolas Peterson and John Taylor have proposed a model of the Indigenous domestic 
moral economy that focuses on circulation and which accounts for the centrality and persistence of 
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sharing. While sharing is inseparable from the division of labour, the minimisation of risk and the 
managing of uncertainty, it is also at the heart of the production and reproduction of social relations, 
egalitarianism and the self. There are four elements to the Indigenous domestic moral economy. It is 
characterised by a universal system of kin classification that requires a flow of goods and services to 
produce and reproduce social relationships. The circulation of goods takes place within the framework 
of an ethic of generosity, informed by the social pragmatics of demand sharing, with open refusal rare, 
since it is seen as a rejection of relatedness. In such social contexts personhood is constituted through 
relatedness, while at the same time it is associated with an egalitarian autonomy.
Diane Austin-Broos has examined the contemporary conflicts that occur between the Indigenous 
domestic moral economy, the welfare economy and the state in central Australia (2003). In the past, 
she argues, kinship relations were mediated by place and religious knowledge to a much greater extent 
than today, when ‘things’ (that is, commodities and the cash with which they are obtained, Austin-
Broos 2003:124) are far more significant. In this context allocative power, that is the relative ability to 
respond to demands, becomes important (Macdonald 2000:96-99). Community bosses10 are people 
who devote much of their time and energy to capturing resources from the service organizations 
in the community, and through getting grants, to service the Indigenous domestic moral economy. 
Such resource procurement is crucial to building strong and extensive families and is the focus of 
much activity by senior people that is interpreted as work in the Western Arrernte domain (Austin-
Broos 2003:125) and elsewhere. Rather than ‘working’, people ‘work for kin’, attending meetings 
many of which are central to resource acquisition (Austin-Broos 2003:128). Although the frequency 
of meetings is much complained about in many communities, people commonly still attend them, 
because so many of them can, eventually, result in resource allocation. It would seem that the pursuit 
of allocative power is not unrelated to the ready support found for new economic and development 
projects because most new projects bring in a flood of resources, especially as most involve substantial 
start-up costs, even if there is no huge commitment to the overall objectives and often relatively little 
concern about their failure.11 
Life projects and development projects
In 2003 the Productivity Commission published a major report, titled Overcoming Indigenous 
Disadvantage, for the Council of Australian Governments. This Council and the report represent a new 
resolve at the highest level of government to tackle ‘the root causes of Indigenous disadvantage’(2003:
v), for which we can read statistical inequality. The Report is based on ‘widespread consultations 
across the country, particularly with Indigenous people and organisations’ (2003:v); it recognises the 
existence of a diversity of situations and that, ‘some central factors, such as culture and governance, 
are inherently difficult to quantify but remain important to document’ (2003:v). Chapter 11, the last 
chapter, is titled ‘Economic participation and development’.  The chapter opens with the following 
statements: 
The extent to which people participate in the economy is closely related to their living 
standards and broader wellbeing.  For the purpose of this Report, economic participation 
and development is examined through employment opportunities, influence over land 
resources, and aspects of education and training which are relevant to the goals of good 
governance and the capacity to govern.
Many aspects of work affect people’s wellbeing, such as hours worked, job satisfaction 
and security, levels of remuneration, opportunity for self-development, and interaction 
with people outside the home.  Having a job or being involved in a business activity not 
only leads to improved incomes for families and communities…it also enhances self-
esteem and reduces social alienation…(2003:11.1)
There was strong feedback during the consultations that governance should be included 
in the framework [of the Report].  The major governance issues highlighted during the 
consultations and in Australian literature were: culturally informed governance structures, 
capacity to govern, accountability, civic engagement, and self determination. (2003:11.2)
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Despite the widespread consultation with Indigenous people this Report, like almost all writing on 
Aboriginal involvement with the Australian economy, is astonishingly naïve, not to say ethnocentric, 
about the cultural nature of economic activity. The curious nod in the direction of cultural factors 
in the Foreword – that they are central but hard to quantify – is just that, as far as recognising 
that all economic activity is cultural. The notion that Indigenous people may have their own life 
projects in either a grand or limited sense is obscured by the pressing moral and political objective 
of achieving statistical equality, more or less, that comes with policies of practical reconciliation and 
mainstreaming. 
The question of why the Indigenous people consulted have not raised their life projects in a 
forceful enough way for them to register in the Report, despite some obvious manifestations of them, 
such as the outstation movement, is worth asking. The Report hints, indirectly, at one possibility. 
When cultural factors are explicitly, and briefly, mentioned in the economic chapter, they relate to 
governance, not economics.  Rather than asking whether, for instance, there is a specifically Indigenous 
economic practice, what Indigenous motivations drive contemporary economic activity, how work 
is defined and understood by Aboriginal people, what notions people have of a work career (see 
Arthur and David-Petero 2000) and whether any or all of these might influence the implementation 
and course of economic development in remote Australia, the focus is on governance.12  While for 
government, governance is primarily about equity and accountability to ensure that organizations 
achieve their constitutional objectives, for Indigenous people it is primarily about self-determination, 
as the above quote suggests.  The Indigenous emphasis on self-determination is fully in keeping with 
the workings of the Indigenous domestic moral economy because, among other things, it is related to 
allocative power and the controlling of resources, which, of course, is one of the great attractions of 
self-determination.
As has been suggested above, Indigenous life projects that do not lead to people becoming  more 
or less statistically equal, and particularly those that mean that people’s levels of health remain poor, 
are always under threat of development projects promoted independently by the state to modify the 
situation. Not only is development increasingly being seen as a right, leading to internal demands from 
the Aboriginal community, but there is always the threat of the politicisation of the inequality by any 
one of a number of external interests. However, development projects directed at remote communities 
to alleviate such situations clearly face considerable problems, yet these are rarely addressed directly. 
This is because addressing cultural issues is too difficult and it is much easier to ascribe the difficulties 
in getting development projects off the ground to a lack of self-determination.  The ultimate irony 
here is that side-stepping cultural issues as an obstacle in economic development, because it can be 
seen as blaming Aboriginal people for their situation, is translated into a situation where it is possible 
to shift the blame to them, through self-determination. 
If there is consideration of material factors in the way of development, one that is commonly 
invoked is locational disadvantage. While this is a very real problem for many remote communities it 
is not the key problem, as communities like Mutijulu make clear.  The Aboriginal people at Mutijulu 
are living on Aboriginal land that is only a few minutes’ drive from a large number of unskilled and 
skilled jobs that range from bed-making and cleaning to management.  Apart from a few Aboriginal 
people working for the Parks and Wildlife Service, the vast majority of the community is employed 
on CDEP, and the population is faced with all of the social problems and difficulties found in such 
communities across the continent (see Smith 2001).13  Apart from the disincentives to prolonged 
engagement with wage labour posed by the workings of the Indigenous domestic moral economy, 
there is another issue. The nature of work available to the unskilled in the twentieth century is surely 
another component of the equation (for example, see Braverman 1974). That is, it is only when 
all other alternatives to securing a living have been closed off that selling labour at the bottom of 
the market is likely to become even mildly attractive. This is indirectly evidenced by references to 
‘culturally appropriate employment’, the many concessions that are regularly made to the expectations 
of work by Indigenous people from non-Indigenous employees, and the kinds of work for which 
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Aboriginal people do offer themselves, such as ranger jobs. Explaining the lack of engagement with 
this mainstream labour market cannot then rely simply on locational disadvantage or poor educational 
qualifications. It has to be understood in terms of motivation, incentives or the lack of them, and the 
social location of Aboriginal people within the Indigenous domestic moral economy.
Richard Davis’s (2004) illuminating account of the contrast between an economically successful (in 
conventional terms) and an economically unsuccessful Kimberley cattle station underlines the point. 
The successful station has an Aboriginal manager who is married to a female land-owner, a permanent 
workforce of his relatives, a physical residential separation of his house from the community, and 
isolation of herd management from claims on it by the Aboriginal land-owners of the station. Davis 
reports that the single most important criticism made of successful Aboriginal managers by other 
Aboriginal people is that they are too autonomous and have opted out of the Indigenous domestic 
moral economy (2004:38). What he is describing here is the process of a small family network 
converting an unviable communal enterprise into a viable family farm. Given that most architects of 
development plans are coming at them from a market perspective, the continued emphasis on ‘the 
community’ as an economic actor, suggests either great confusion or an unwillingness to face the 
difficulties related to development. 
Conclusion
The dynamics of the Indigenous domestic moral economy cannot be understood, of course, 
apart from the relations with the encapsulating society.  As capitalist economies, the encapsulating 
societies are responsible for the forces that threaten its dissolution, but as liberal democratic welfare 
states they inadvertently contribute to its reproduction. In remote Australia Aboriginal people come 
from a historically low material base which, combined with the processes of the Indigenous domestic 
moral economy, work powerfully to reduce the level of consumer dependency. This in turn leads to 
a casual engagement with development projects when people are socially located within their own 
communities. Only when people’s consumer dependency is a great deal higher than it is today, so 
that it cannot be maintained by transfer payments, subsidies, grants, loans, royalty payments, casual 
employment or target working can people be expected to become motivated and involved in the 
treadmill of wage labour, and the emphasis on circulation reduced.14 
For remote communities this would require everybody in the community to have a similar high 
standard of living/consumer dependency that could only be supported by selling labour, but for 
most such communities this cannot be done locally. An alternative might be a remittance economy 
supported by the young away at work. Otherwise people have to distance themselves in some way 
from the Indigenous domestic moral economy by moving away, by marrying somebody outside it or 
by adopting a completely different way of life, such as commitment to a demanding Christian sect. All 
these processes are going on apace among Aboriginal people at large, but in remote communities the 
frequencies are much lower.
The chances of many Indigenous life projects in remote Australia being able to proceed independently 
of development projects is small because of Aboriginal people’s economic status.  In theory, where 
such development projects minimize the loss of people’s control over their own allocation of time 
and effort, they may have some appeal, but the tensions between rewards to the individual (compared 
with autonomy) and recognition of demands on which relatedness relies, will surely prove difficult 
for most people to negotiate when at home. Poverty, discrimination and marginalisation all increase 
the intensity of sharing, while affluence and emerging consumer dependency, at some point, start to 
reduce its frequency and nature. The entailments of these latter changes are as potentially profound as 
the initial resistances are strong: they bring with them a move away from exchange value to use value; 
the moral economy of households starts to turn inwards and an individualistic orientation becomes 
more pronounced.   Sharing becomes the site of intense social struggle, shaming practices, threats 
of ostracism and appeals to ideologies of what it means to be Indigenous are turned on relatives and 
acquaintances who are clearly prospering, in an attempt to maintain the levels of sharing, relatedness 
and the values of egalitarianism.15 For many, issues of identity also become of great importance as 
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individuals move into a moral and reflexive psychological space that is increasingly separated from 
the dense sociality of extended kin relations and abstracted from community. These are the issues 
that lie at the heart of engagement with the real economy.  For an economy to be ‘real’, there have 
to be profound material consequences for not engaging with it. In remote Australia there remains a 
considerable way to go before such consequences emerge.
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Endnotes
1  For Altman, the living within a hybrid economy is a rational response to the absence of a market economy in many 
remote regions.
2  For example see World Council of Churches 1981; Altman 1991).
3 By moral hazard I am here referring to the transfer of risk (not necessarily consciously) to the state from Indigenous 
directors of corporations, councils and associations who rarely, if ever, have to bear responsibility for actions and 
behaviours that would generally lead to prosecution in the wider community. The fact that the levels of scrutiny and 
accountability required of Indigenous organizations are so high, is a direct reflection of the problems faced by the state 
in respect to this issue. Further it is bound to intervene quite quickly when things go wrong, to pick up the tab a second 
time, because of poverty of the populations involved and the political and ethical problems that letting people live with 
the consequences would entail.
4  A good example of a formal accommodation would be the slow worker clause proposed in the negotiations for the 
amended pastoral award in the 1960s.
5  As has been pointed out by a number of authors, the Fish Creek group on which Sahlins bases much of his argument 
is completely atypical in its demographic composition, which undoubtedly skewed the analysis (see Altman 1984 who 
also argues elsewhere that people worked harder than is generally realized). 
6  In his unpublished manuscript, The Aborigines of Australia, at page xi, Thomson wrote:
[Mummification and the] onerous ritual that accompanies it would appear to the white man merely to impose 
a further load upon their already heavily-burdened economy, without at first sight, conferring any material 
benefit upon the society. But we know that to hold a place, to remain as a functional entity, it must serve some 
real need in the lives of the people who have adopted it. Just what it does, and in what way it benefits the people, 
are among the questions that the field anthropologist sets himself to answer as he studies the people.
7  Most people still remained engaged with the bush, leaving the settlement for ceremonies and to seek out valued and 
familiar bush foods instead of the staple rations of Maningrida.
8  Even painting was abandoned for a period in some situations (see Altman) where it was the one item produced for 
exchange
9  In the context of encapsulated Fourth World peoples there are two aspects to their moral economy. There is the aspect 
relating to the allocation of resources to the reproduction of relations internal to the indigenous social order, and there 
is the aspect relating to the notions about the nature of the asymmetrical reciprocity relations with the encapsulating 
society. At least initially, the relations of the domestic moral economy are likely to be the basis for relationships with 
outsiders: I will deal only with the former here. However, Fred Myers has documented the way in which Pintupi people 
sought to impose a moral economy on the whites they interacted with, by trying to encompass them within their 
own internal practices relating to authority and deference (1986).   This moral economy accords more closely with a 
Thompsonian conceptualisation of moral economy but is complicated by the Pintupi’s encapsulation within a welfare 
state, the rationale for which is unknown to them. See also Scott (1989) for Cree views on colonial moral in Canada.
10  Bosses are distinguished from leaders in that the latter are ritual experts, while the former are people who have become 
foci of allocative power as they have captured community resources.  There may well be overlap between the two 
categories.
11  For instance in the 1980s, 87 percent of ATSIC-funded Indigenous enterprises resulted in economic failure, which led 
the Office of Evaluation and Audit to argue that there was a strong case for terminating the program (Martin 1995:
19).
12  In respect of young people in the Torres Strait, Arthur and David-Petero found that only 27 percent of their sample 
gave a financial reason for choosing to do particular work in 1998, whereas 37 percent said they chose the particular 
work out of interest and enjoyment (2000:14).
13  From an economic perspective it might be argued that part of the problem is the well-known poverty trap, which 
means that one has to earn quite a lot to off-set welfare entitlements, thus reducing the incentive to get work. I think 
that, in general terms, this argument is of very limited significance.  This is indicated by the fact that in many remote 
situations, the Aboriginal people who are taking up the jobs are often from outside of the local Aboriginal community 
or, having got a job move away from it.
14  At the time of writing this, the NLC  announced that it was looking to take a 40 percent stake in the proposed $500 
million trans-Territory gas pipeline because the ‘potential returns from the project would give much-needed economic 
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independence to Aborigines’ (Australian 27/10/04 page 5).  While there are clearly many good reasons for doing so, 
unworked-for income is unlikely to address the day-to-day economic problems facing individuals and families.
15  As social relations become attenuated, ‘Shame, the experience of self-inflicted injury on the person’ (Austin-Broos 
1996:180) becomes less and less effective.
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